An Exploration and Critique of the methodology of N.T. Wright with particular reference to Historical Jesus Research

The purpose of this paper is to examine and analyse the methodology of N.T. Wright as presented in part II of *New Testament and the People of God (NTPOG)*, and used and developed in *Jesus and the Victory of God (JVOG)*. This paper is broken down into the following sections. Part A of this paper will examine the broad contours of Wright's epistemological method, whereas part B shall look, with an eye on the quest for the historical Jesus, at how the insights from part A are developed in regards to historiography.

**Part A: Epistemological Method, Critical Realism**

In JVOG Wright seeks to apply his methodology from NTPOG part II to the quest for the historical Jesus. In order to be able to engage with Wright's reconstruction of the historical Jesus it is necessary to examine his methodological approach for 'if we do not explore presuppositional matters, we can expect endless and fruitless debate.'¹ so 'it is vital that a project such as this one should show from the outset where it stands on basic questions of method.'²

N.T. Wright adopts an epistemological method called critical realism which is contrasted, by Wright, to the (i) positivist position and (ii) phenomenalism which are the 'optimistic and pessimistic version of the enlightenment epistemological project.'³

**a) 'Positivism'**

The positivist position, which Wright associates with 'naïve realism' seeks 'solid and unquestionable knowledge'⁴. The knower, from a positivist standpoint has 'instant access to raw

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² Ibid. 32
³ Ibid. 32
⁴ Ibid. 32-33
data about which they can simply make propositions on the basis of sense experience. The following diagram illustrates the directness, and absence of the hermeneutical spiral, from the observer to the object.

Observer -- > Object

- simply looking at objective reality
- tested by empirical observation
- if it doesn't work, it's nonsense

b) Phenomenalism

The phenomenalist, in contrast to the optimistic and epistemological certainty of the 'positivist' 'translates talk about external objects... into statements about sense data,' for 'the only thing of which I [positivist] can be sure when confronted by things in (what seems to be) the external world are my own sense-data'.

Observer -- > Object

- I seem to have evidence of external reality

Observer <> Object

- but I am really only sure of my sense data

Critical Realism

In contrast to both of these positions N.T Wright proposes a form of critical realism. This is a way of describing the process of 'knowing' that acknowledges the reality of thing known, as something other than the knower (hence realism), whilst also fully acknowledging that the only access we have to this reality lies along the spiralling path of appropriate dialogue or conversation between the knower and thing known(hence 'critical). This path leads to critical reflection on the products of our enquiry into 'reality', so that our assertions about 'reality' acknowledge their own provisionality. Knowledge, in other words, although in principal concerning realities independent of the mid of the knower, is never itself independent of the knower.

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5 Ibid. 33
6 Ibid. 34
7 Ibid. 34
8 Ibid. 35
Positivist stress the reality of the object at the expense of the subjectivity of the knower whereas phenomenalism stresses the subjective role of the knower whilst being unable to talk about reality outside of the mind of the knower. In contrast to these two positions critical realism does not lose either the subjectivity of the knower, nor the reality of a world which exists outside of the mind of the knower.

Wright represents this diagrammatically,

Observer----------------------------=> Object

initial observation

is challenged by critical reflection

but can survive the challenge and speak truly of reality.

A critical realist approach seeks to overcome the false choice between pure objectivity and pure subjectivity, between an enlightenment epistemology and the post-modern response.

Wright notes three things which are needed for critical awareness

I) There is no 'gods eye view available to human beings.'

II) All information from the real world is interpreted 'through a grid of expectations, memories, stories, psychological states and so on'. 'it is peculiar in terms of my worldview'.

III) 'We belong to a particular human community', in which the cosmos is interpreted in a myriad of ways, for 'every human community shares and cherishes certain assumptions, traditions, expectations, anxieties, and so forth, which encourage its members to construe reality in particular ways'.

Critical Realism: How does it Work?

Critical Realism seeks positively to attain knowledge by taking account of worldviews and using a method of 'hypothesis and verification', both of which should be used intentionally, according to
Wright, as the tools of critical reflection.

**Stories and Worldviews**

In the positivist epistemological model hypotheses are 'constructed out of the sense data received, and then go in search of more sense-evidence which will either confirm, modify or destroy the hypothesis thus created.' However, for Wright, a hypothesis does not simply spring up from the data but 'needs a larger framework on which to draw, a larger set of stories about things which happen in the world.' External reality is perceived from a framework of reference, a worldview which is characterised at a basic level by stories. We cannot simply 'see' the historical truth, as with naïve realism, for we live in a story laden world. 'There is no such thing as 'neutral' or 'objective' proof; only the claim that the story we are now telling about the world as a whole makes more sense.'

A good hypothesis, or story, will attain the following.

- Simplicity of Outline
- Elegance in handling the details within it
- The inclusion of all parts of the story
- The ability of the story to make sense beyond its immediate subject matter.

**Hypothesis and Verification**

A full account of verification, according to Wright, must include the following. I) question II) hypothesis III) testing of hypothesis

- (I) Question: The question arises 'because one's present story is in some way either puzzling or incomplete'
- (II) Hypothesis: A new story which offers itself as an explanation
- (III) Success of the story to include all of the data.

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11 Ibid 37  
12 Ibid 37  
13 Ibid. 42  
14 Ibid.42  
15 Ibid. 42
The following fictional story illustrates the cognitive method of hypothesis and verification.

I arrive home to find my front door unlocked which raises a number of questions. Did I forget to unlock it? Have I been broken into? The explanatory stories, answers to these questions, are hypotheses. These explanatory stories appear to arrive by intuition. On moving into the house I see the TV is missing. I here find that one of the explanatory stories has emerged as a 'successful explanatory story' as it makes sense of the new data. We see that a story gives rise to a question, new stories appear, that is hypotheses are put forward, which begin to make sense of the data in a simple matter. These new stories can be verified with external reality. I could have have had as a hypothesis the story that the wife had taken the TV to work and forgotten to lock the door. Yet this is not the simplest story which accounts for the data. This story, as with Wright's driving story, shows what is meant by hypothesis and verification.

Wright offers the following diagram.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Story-telling humans</th>
<th>Story-laden world</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>initial observation (already within a story)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is challenged by critical reflection on ourselves as story-tellers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(i.e) recognising that our claims about reality may be mistaken</td>
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<tr>
<td>but can, through further narrative, find alternative ways of speaking truly about the world, with the use of new or modified stories.</td>
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**Summary and Conclusion**

We have seen that Wright puts forward an epistemological position known as critical realism. This approach seeks to recognise that we do not arrive at knowledge through sense perception alone but that the mind of the knower interacts with data to produce stories, hypothesis and knowledge.

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16 Ibid. 43
These broad strokes of a critical realist approach to knowing provide, at a presuppositional level, the basis of Wright's historiographical method. It is to this which we will now turn.

**Part B: Historiography and the Quest for the Historical Jesus**

N.T. Wright seeks to apply the insights of critical realism to the task of doing history which brings with it its own epistemological challenges.

History, which we may define, in this conversation, as what people write about what happened in the real world, is understood as a 'kind of knowledge' which neither proceeds down the road of simply giving bare facts, nor does it fall into the wayside of subjectivity. Instead the task of history is the 'meaningful narrative of events and intentions'.

Wright rejects both the 'pre critical' and the 'chastened positivist' approaches to historiography. These are represented, by Wright, diagrammaticality

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Pre-Critical

Observer       Evidence       Past Event
              ---------->          ---------->
simply looking at the evidence.....and having direct access to the 'facts'
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N.T Wright is not original in his critique of a pre theoretical or a positivist approach, these matters have long been discussed in courses and books on historiography. E.H Carr, in one of the standard

17 NTPOG 81
texts for those who are interested in historiography, comments, and then critiques, this 'common-sense view of history'.

History consist of a corpus of ascertained facts. The facts are available to the historian in documents, inscriptions and so on, like fish on the fish monger's slab. The historian collects them, take them home, and cooks and serves them in whatever style appeals to him.  

There is simply no uninterpreted history,

'The myth of uninterpreted history functions precisely as a myth in much modern discourse—that is, it expresses an ideal state of affairs which we imagine erroneously to exist, and which influences the way we think and speak. But it is a 'myth', in the popular sense for all that.'

All mainstream scholars would reject the pre-critical view of historiography but many still adopt a more sophisticated positivist viewpoint, which differs from the pre-critical approach as it involves the sifting of evidence.

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**Table: Positivist Approach**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positivist</th>
<th>Observer</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
<th>Past events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>looking at the evidence, sifting it</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rejecting some bits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and accepting others</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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18 Carr, E. H. *What is History?* 9 The positivist position is defended by Leopold Von Ranke 'You have reckoned that history ought to judge the past and to instruct the contemporary world as to the future. The present attempt does not yield to that high office. It will merely tell how it really was." In a recent publication Peter Tomson makes the remark about 2nd temple Judaism and historiography 'There is no short cut. Books that promise the reader direct access to 'the facts', for example, by means of newly discovered manuscripts, are misleading. The same is true of scientific treatises with the unfounded pretence of providing an 'objective account'. Each rendering is an interpretation and each interpretation is in principle disputable. Progress, that is, getting closer to the reality of that time, can only be made if we gradually learn to accommodate our representation of that reality more adequately to what the sources bring to light in all of their concrete diversity.' Peter Tomson, 'If This Be from Heaven...': Jesus and the New Testament Authors in Their Relationship to Judaism, 33 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001).

19 NTPOG 85, 'the Myth of Objective Data or of Presuppositionalist History, and the purpose of my present argument is to challenge it, there is in fact no such thing as 'mere history'. There are data. Manuscripts exist, even very ancient ones. Coins and archaeological data are available. From these we can know quite a lot about the ancient world, with a good a knowledge as we have of anything else at all. But in order even to collect manuscripts manuscripts and coins, let alone read, translate or organise them into editions or collections, we must engage in 'interpretation'...My present point is simply that all history is interpreted history' NT&POG 88 'Intellectual honesty consists not in forcing an impossible neutrality, but admitting that neutrality is not possible' NT&POG 89
This approach, however, is an illusion and does not take into account the subjectivity of the knower. In the 'new quest' for the historical Jesus the criteria approach resembled to some degree the positivist understanding of history.

I offer the following explanatory diagram.

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Observer ----> Jesus Tradition ----> 'Real Jesus'
              \                      /
               v                      v
Putting the 'Jesus Tradition' through a series of criterion
<------------------
rejecting some bits
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and accepting others
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For Wright the path of history is to be arrived at by a recognition of the valid role of subjectivity for all history involves selection, a spiral of knowledge in which interpreter and the source dialogue. There is no neutral position in which the historian can simply arrive at knowledge or fact as all historians have a point of view, and all histories involve interpretation through a particular set of lenses.  

Peter Novick in *That Nobel Dream: The Objectivity Question* surveyed and examined American historians and their historiographical method. He found that 'the very centre of the professional historical venture is the idea and ideal of objectivity ... for 'Truth is one a, not perspectival' as 'historian's role is that of a neutral, or disinterested, judge,'  

Wright offers the following summary of his historiographical approach, which shows how he

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20 NTPOG 86-92
22 A good introduction to the key issues and texts is found in Keith Jenkins *Postmodern History Reader*
rejects a objectivist approach,

‘History, then, is real knowledge, of a particular sort. It is arrived at, like all, knowledge, by
the spiral of epistemology, in which the story-telling human community launches enquiries,
forms provisional judgements about which stories are likely to be successful in answering
those enquiries, and then tests these judgements by further interaction with data.’

Historical Method: Hypothesis and Verification

Knowledge of the past is achieved through a method of hypothesis and verification. A hypothesis
is essentially a construct, thought up by a human mind, which offers itself as a story about a
particular set of phenomena, in which the story, which is bound to be an interpretation of those
phenomena also offers an explanation of them.’ For a historical hypothesis to be a good
hypothesis, and receive verification, it must

1. must include all the data [evidence]
2. must construct a basically simple and coherent overall picture
3. prove itself fruitful in other areas

For Wright the ‘inclusion of data is ultimately the more important of the two criteria’. To avoid
misunderstanding we must recognise that a hypothesis, for Wright, must, include all the data. This
does not mean that all data is authentic or historically reliable. Instead the overarching hypothesis
must take account of all the data before judgements are made of its reliability.

Critique of Wright's Definition of a Good Hypothesis.

I) Selection of Data

A good hypothesis will find verification from the data. Yet a hypothesis, whether it be in
theoretical or non theoretical thought, cannot make sense of all the data, but can only makes sense
of selection of the data. This may be illustrated with the example of a detective looking for

23 NTPOG 109. It is worth reading Wright's definition alongside Keith Jenkins Re-thinking History,: 'History is a
shifting, problematic discourse, ostensibly about an aspect of the world, the past, that is produced by a group of
present -minded workers (overwhelmingly in our culture salaried historians) who go about their work in mutually
recognisable ways that are epistemologically, methodologically, ideologically and practically positioned and
whose products, once in circulation, are subject to a series of uses and abuses that are logically infinite but which
in actuality generally correspond to a range of power bases that exist at any given moment and which structure
and distribute the meanings of histories along a dominant marginal spectrum.’ 26, For Keith Jenkins history is
about 'power', for Wright 'knowledge' and for Von Ranke 'telling what really happened'.

24 This has been discussed in part One of this paper, but here the attention is one historiography, rather than
knowledge in general.
evidence in a house robbery. A detective may develop a hypothesis about the burglar which includes some data including footprints, a broken window and fingerprints. However intelligent, methodological or scientific this detective is she cannot include all of the data, but only needs to include the relevant data.

The complexity of life means that objects and historical artefacts, cannot be be known in totality, nor do we need to have all data available before us before making a judgement, or a claim to knowledge. In historical research we do not need exhaustive knowledge in all the modal spheres, that is we do not need to know all arithmetic, spatial, kinematic, physical, biotic, sensitive, analytic, historical, lingual, social, economic, aesthetic, juridical, ethical or pistic aspects of a particular historical person or epoch25.

To illustrate this we may say that Jesus must be understood against the geographical backdrop of Galilee26. This not mean that we need to pursue exhasutively topological and biotic data. Wright accepts that the 'stack of data to be included is vast and bewildering27 and accepts that 'seeing and assembling the data is a monstrous task'.28 This assembling, surely involves selection, which brings with it, even at the data level, an amount of subjectivity, for what is relevant data to one community is irrelevant to another.

Verification of hypotheses must make sense of the relevant data, not of all the data. In moving from 'all the data' to 'relevant data' the role of subjectivity and the knower's horizon becomes more dominant for what is relevant to one community is irrelevant for another.

II) Coherency

Wright, as with others, argues that the task of the historian is to produce a coherent overall picture from the complex and diverse data available by the historian. In other words a narrative is to be created in which each part of the jigsaw is linked to the next. As with Heru Marrou,

25 NTPOG 99 Particularly helpful in this regard is the theory of modal aspects developed by Dutch philosophers Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven. See Kalsbeek, L. Contours of a Christian Philosophy : An Introduction to Herman Dooyeweerd's Thought as a helpful secondary source.
26 As in Freyne, Sean. Jesus, A Jewish Galilean : A New Reading of the Jesus Story.
27 NTPOG 100
28 Ibid. 101
This brings us to the essential point: explanation in history is the discovery, the comprehension, the analysis of a thousand ties, which in a possibly inextricable fashion, unite the many faces of human reality to one another. These ties bind each phenomenon to neighbouring phenomena, each state to the previous ones, immediate or remote (and in like manner to their results.)

It may be argued that the complexity of human beings will not allow a simple and coherent hypothesis to be produced. Charles Tilly, the historical sociologist argues that history cannot put into a coherent whole all experiences of the past for ‘it is not humanly possible to construct a coherent analysis of the history of all social relationships; the object of history is too complex, diverse and big.’ Tilly is correct to argue that it is not possible to join the dots of all social relationships. However in the previous section I suggested that Wright's inclusion of all the data for a good hypothesis should be replaced by inclusion of the relevant data. Once relevancy, over and against all, is accepted then it is humanly possible to construct a coherent analysis. With relevant, and thus selected data, we can confidently offer a non totalising, coherent narrative. This narrative construct, given that it is based on a selection of data, and is constructed in the mind of the knower, is open to critique and review.

However I suggest that it is possible for different historical constructs and narrative to dialogue, and for one construction be more legitimate and plausible. It is not a case that all constructs are equally as valid or as plausible. This is not simply a retreat back into an objectivist account of historiography for these constructs are non totalising, in that it may be possible to talk of the same historical period, or person, from a different perspective which can be as equally as authentic and ‘true’.

W.H Walsh, in his method known as 'colligation' shows how from the mass of data, selections are made from which themes and developments can be made.

'The historian and his reader initially confront what looks like a largely unconnected mass of material, and the historian then goes on to show that sense can be made of it by revealing certain pervasive themes and developments...he picks out what was significant in the events he relates, what is significant here being what points beyond itself and connects with other happenings as phases in a continuous process.'

Theodore Zeldin was one of the first historians to be critical of the traditional and narrative

29 Cited in Jenkins, Keith. The Postmodern History Reader 142
30 Ibid. 141
31 Ibid. 142
history, and instead proposed a history on the model of a pointilliste painting, composed entirely of unconnected dots.\textsuperscript{32} This extreme postmodern position offers a critique to criticise Wright at a basic epistemological level, for the desire to impose a unified-story on the hypothesis is seen, by some, as a quest for power. However, pointilliste painting\textsuperscript{33} provides an example of Wright's historical method. To analyse a small section of one of these paintings would lead to confusion and a multiplicity of interpretations, yet when the whole picture is viewed one is able to see that what seems like disconnected random dots are in fact part of a larger story/picture.

Wright recognises the complexity of the human situation but states that despite this there can be coherence and stability to our historical constructs.\textsuperscript{34}

**Guiding Questions**

In J&VOG Wright sets forth a number of questions which any serious scholar of the New Testament will answer either implicitly or explicitly. These questions, five in all, are all subdivisions of the main question\textsuperscript{35}: How do we get from pluriform Judaism that existed within Greco-Roman world of 10BC to the pluriform Judaism and Christianity of AD110? This question in turn breaks into the following questions:

1. How does Jesus fit into Judaism?
2. What were Jesus' Aims?
3. Why did Jesus die?
4. How and Why did the Early Church Begin?
5. Why are the Gospels what they Are?

These questions 'form the jigsaw of Jesus himself, which is itself a piece in the larger jigsaw of the rise of Christianity as a whole.'\textsuperscript{36} We notice that the jigsaw is that of the rise of Christianity, this being the overarching framework in which the individual pieces are placed. IF these parameters

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid. 161
\textsuperscript{33} http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Seurat-La_Parade_detail.jpg
\textsuperscript{34} NTPOG 107, ‘The very subject matter of history is unruly, and all attempts to reduce it to order by a sort of intellectual martial law are suspect. The more one knows about any event, the more complex one realises it to be’ NTPOG 105
\textsuperscript{35} JVOG 88-113
\textsuperscript{36} JVOG 113
were changed then the jigsaw pieces could be placed in a different coherent narrative. If the parameters were that of explaining the fall of Jerusalem or of the Roman empire, then the pieces used in the 'rise of Christianity Jigsaw' would be used in a different construction. The historian then, chooses, his parameters, framework and subject matter as an artist would choose his canvas, materials and subject matter.

In JVOG Chapter 4, Wright provides a hypothesis which seeks to provide integrated answers to the above questions, a hypothesis 'of the prophetic son; the son, Israel-in-person, who will himself go into the far country, who will take himself the shame of Israel's exile, so that the kingdom may come, the covenant be renewed, and the prodigal welcome of Israel's god, the creator, to be extended to the ends of the earth.'

**Aims and Intentions**

These hypotheses, or narratives, which seek to answer the overarching questions, must make sense of the aims and intentions of the characters involved in the history. Wright defines 'Aims' and 'Intentions'

- **Aim**: fundamental direction of a person's life, or some fairly settled subset of that fundamental direction. The aim is the directional aspect of a person mindset.
- **Intention**: The specific application of the 'aim' in particular.
- **Motivation**: the specific sense, on one occasion, that a certain action or set of actions is appropriate and desirable.

Historical Knowledge must account for the aims, intentions and motivations, the difference being illustrated in the quote below.

Jesus **aim** was (we may say) to inaugurate the 'kingdom of God'; his **intention**, towards the end of his life, was to go to Jerusalem; within both of these, he was **motivated** on one particular day to go into the Temple and set about in overturning the tables.

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37 JVOG 133
38 NTPOG 111
Historical knowledge seeks to offer a hypothesis which shows the interconnectedness of events and which pays attention to worldviews and individual mindsets.  

'The task of the historian is not simply to assemble little clumps of 'facts' and hope that somebody else will integrate them. The historians job is to show their interconnectedness, that is, how one thing follows from another, precisely by examining the 'inside' of the events....it is that of the one interplay of fully human life-the complex networks of human aims, intentions and motivations, operating within and at the edges of the worldviews of different communities and the mindsets of different individuals. To display this, the historian needs (it will come as no surprise) to tell a story.'

Historical knowledge, which is achieved through a process of hypothesis and verification using aims, intentions, world-view and mindsets, is able to speak authentically about past events. The historical reconstruction is not set in stone but is able to be improved upon or rejected if a more plausible hypothesis receives verification. History, for Wright, with echoes of the highly influential historian-philosopher, R.G Collingwood, seeks to understand inside of the event. The outside of the event, according to Collingwood, is 'everything belonging to it which can be described in terms of bodies and their movements whereas the inside of the event is the intention of the characters, or 'that which can only be described as thought. '.

His work may begin by discovering the outside of an event, but it can never end there, he must must always remember that the event was an action, and that his main task is to think himself into this action, to discern the thought of the agent.' ....'When an historian asks 'Why did Brutus stab Caesar?' he means 'What did Brutus think, which made him decide to stab Caeser?' The cause of the event, for him, means the thought in the mind of the person by whose agency the event came about: and this is not something other than the event, it is the inside of the event itself'.

**Worldviews and Mindsets**

Serious history seeks to understand the inside of an event, which in turn means that one must look seriously at the worldviews of those involved.

In order to answer the question 'Why?' in relation to the past, we must move from the 'outside' of the event to the 'inside'; this involves reconstructing the worldviews of people other than

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39 Ibid. 112 For Wright worldviews are communal whereas a mindset is a worldview held by one person.
40 Ibid. 113
42 Ibid. 213
43 Ibid. 215
ourselves. 44

Worldviews are to be understood as 'the basic stuff of human existence, the lens through which we see the world'45, They 'are like the foundations of a house: vital, but invisible. They are that through which, not at which, a society or an individual normally looks; they form the grid according to which humans organise reality, not bits of reality that offer themselves for organisation. 46

Worldviews, can be studied in terms of four features, that of stories, fundamental symbols, praxis and a set of questions and answers. To understand a society one must be able to sketch out the worldview. Likewise to study an individual a historian, aiming at the inside of the event, must be able to sketch out the contours of their individual mindset47.

Narrative or story, having previously been discussed, is the most 'characteristic expression of worldview, going deeper than the isolated observation or fragmented remark'. 48 To understand the aims and intentions of a character from history it is necessary to pay attention to the symbols which they cherish, the habitual praxis of the community and to sketch out answers to the basic worldview questions. Wright basis his questions on Brian Walsh Transforming Vision49, moving the questions from the singular to the plural. Who are we? Where are we? What is Wrong? and What is the Solution? 50

Wright, in my opinion, is to be applauded for his work on worldview as a tool for historical research for it allows different cultures to be grasped, in broad strokes, by the mind of the knower. It allows the historian to make generalisations about the aims and intentions of a community, to be able to construct a narrative from events, based on the reconstructed horizons of the community/person, bringing to the fore the differing worldview of the past culture/individual and

44 NT POG 121
45 ibid 124 In full, 'Worldviews are the basic stuff of human existence, the lens through which the world is seen, the blueprint for how one should live in it, and above all the sense of identity and place which enables human beings to be what they are. To ignore worldviews, either our own or those of the culture we are studying, would result in extraordinary shallowness.'
46 NTPOG 125
47 For Wright a worldview of an individual is called a mindset.
48 Ibid. 123 For a history of the concept of Worldview, Weltanschauung, see Naugle, David K. Worldview : The History of a Concept.
50 Another example of differing worldview question are found in the work of social anthropologist Robert Redfield who articulates them in The Primitive World and Its Transformations, They are What is confronted? What is the nature of not-man? What is a man called upon to do? What is the source of the orderliness of things?
the historian.

Cultural anthropology, bearing a resemblance to historical research, has used the concept of worldview (weltanschauung) as a helpful tool for studying different cultures. Bronislaw Malinowski, polish anthropologists, who penned the _Argonauts of the Western Pacific_ in the early 1920's, expresses his love of his subject in the terms of worldview,

What interests me really in the study of the native is his outlook on things, his Weltanschauung, the breath of life and reality which he breathes and by which he lives. Every human culture gives its members a definite vision of the world, a definite zest for life. In the roamings over human history, and over the surface of the earth, it is the possibility of seeing life and the world from the various angles, particular to each culture, that has always charmed me most, and inspired me with real desire to penetrate other cultures, to understand other types of life.

**Critique of Worldview Approach**

The danger of this approach is that a monolithic worldview is advanced which does not account for the diversity of the culture or peoples group. In NTPOG Wright sketches out the contours of a Judaic worldview, paying close attention to story, worldview questions, symbols and praxis. Luke Timothy Johnson, in a review of NTPOG, questions the 'artificial unification into a single story,' noting that serious work on diaspora Judaism or the Greco-Roman background is missing. Johnson wonders whether the desire to have a 'normative/mainline Judaism' is not 'desired primarily to enable a meaningful comparison between its 'story' and that of nascent Christianity'. In response to these accusations Wright accepts the variety within Judaism but says that he is

'good company with much mainstream scholarship on first-century Palestinian Judaism in arguing that many Jews, including Jesus, regarded themselves as living within a narrative world that we can, in principle, reconstruct in arguing that many others, who might not have been able to articulate, ordered their lives around the symbols and symbolic praxis that embodied and sustained this narratival world.'

Within cultural anthropology the concept of worldview has gained imporatnce. However, there is, as Michael Kearney states, a 'surprising dearth of theoretical reflection on the topic', which in part can be explained by the 'linguistic turn' in social theory. Michael Kearney, _Worldview_, has sought

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51 Bronislaw Malinowski, _Argonauts of the Western Pacific_ 517 cited in Naugle _Worldview_ 238
52 537 _Journal of Biblical Literature_, Vol 113,3 Fall 1994, 537 also see Luke Timothy Johnson's chapter in _Jesus and the Restoration of Israel_ Ch11, He notes Wright's tendency to 'create an artificially unified worldview out of the complex of first century Judaism'.
53 Wright 'In Grateful Dialogue' _Jesus & The Restoration of Israel_ 252-253
54 Naugle _Worldview_ 239
55 Micheal Kearney, _Worldview_, also 'World View Theory and Study' _Annual Review of Anthropology_ 4
to advance the theory of worldview in his cultural anthropology as worldview *is a powerful tool for exploring the recesses of socially constructed human consciousness*. Naugle, a worldview expert, pays Kearney the compliment of saying *it is one of the most complete worldview models available today in any discipline*.

Kearney understands, due to his Marxist concerns to critique and liberate meaning systems, *the concept of worldview as having the 'potential—as largely yet unrealised—for liberation in all senses of the word*. Kearney explictely illustrates in this quote, although often undeclared in other authors, to the fact that all worldviews, and theories of worldviews, are themselves, a product of the worldview of the historian or the cultural anthropologist. As Naugle states, a *worldview, in other words, underlies any and every theory of worldview*. 'Worldview models and theories are not the product of of presuppositionless thinking.'

In seems to me that Walsh and Middleton's worldview questions, which Wright uses, stem from an affluent western Christian tradition in which time is linear and in which salvation (What is the problem? What is the solution?), and in which story, symbol, and praxis are readily identifiable concepts. Wright's worldview model sees stories and symbols being the dominant strain within a Jewish worldview and mindset, with ideas and theology being the driving forces of a community. Would this really be the dominant theme, shaping aims and intentions, for those who experience poverty and hunger? Does Wright's model, by its very nature, downplay the economic side of the worldview, thus making all 2nd temple Jews theologically attuned and literate. A similar point is made by Kearney when he says that cultural anthropologists,

*'living in a world of ideas, they tend to let this preoccupation with mental phenomena shape their anthropological theory and assume that ideas have the same importance in the lives of the people they study.'*

**Holism v Atomism**

In regards to methodology in Historical Jesus research N.T Wright is somewhat of a maverick. In

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56 (1975):247-27, as discussed in Naugle *Worldview* 239-240
57 Ibid. 9 cited in Naugle *Worldview* 240
58 Naugle *Worldview* 240
59 Ibid. 241
59 Kearney 16, cited in Naugle 241. Kearney makes the distinction between cultural idealists, who stress the study of ideas, and historical materialists in which history is vitally connected to the material world.
my previous paper, *Historical Jesus 'Method and Criteria'*\(^{60}\) we observed an approach to producing a reconstruction of the historical Jesus which proceeds by sifting the data to find authentic material by using a number of criteria. This authentic material provides the bedrock from which a reconstruction can take place. Wright bucks this trend, which is the basis of the methodology of Meier, Crossan, McKnight and Pitre\(^{61}\), by adopting a method known as 'Holism', with the criteria approach being known as 'atomism'.

In conversation with Jimmy Dunn in 2004 Wright contrasts his holistic approach to that of the atomistic approach of the Jesus seminar.

> and perhaps we should shift into this atomistic versus grand narrative thing, because it’s one of the things that’s going to come between us, at some point, anyway – one of the things which for me has characterized the “third quest” over against the new quest and particularly the Jesus Seminar, is that the Jesus Seminar insisted on first chopping up the tradition into the smallest possible units and then trying to decide on the individual units, one by one, as though they were the only things in the world. Only then, supposedly, would they put them together and form a composite picture of Jesus. In fact they didn’t do that because what they spent their time doing was evaluating those things against a presumed picture of Jesus. So you get a tiny little fragment of tradition which includes Jesus quoting a bit of the Psalms or Isaiah or something, and Funk says in his commentary that this is very unlikely to come from Jesus because this Jesus never quoted the Old Testament. How can you possibly say that about that point?\(^{62}\)

A helpful discussion of these approaches is found in Donald Denton's monograph *Historiography and Hermeneutics in Jesus Studies* whose primary interest is an analysis of the methodology of Crossan and Meyer, but this, as Denton shows, has implications for understanding Wright's method. Holism, as Denton explains, 'recognises that the intelligibility of individual things depends ultimately on the context in which those things are perceived and in which they play a part. Individual phenomena are necessarily seen to be what they are within some larger whole'.\(^{63}\)

Denton notes that the term 'holism' is not widely used within historical Jesus research but various 'contexts, or wholes' are receiving renewed attention in the third quest. Wright, perhaps the most well known proponent of a holistic approach, rejects an atomistic approach whereby one analyses small bits of data and build upon them, and holds, and favours a contextual meta-narrative.

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\(^{61}\) I mention McKnight and Pitre in particular as they are leading scholars in looking at the atonement and the historical Jesus. Pitre, Brant. 2006. *Jesus, the Tribulation, and the End of the Exile: Restoration Eschatology and the Origin of the Atonement*, and McKnight, Scott. 2005. *Jesus and His Death: Historiography, the Historical Jesus and Atonement Theory*. Baylor University Press,

\(^{62}\) *An Evening Conversation* 7-8

\(^{63}\) Denton *Historiography and Hermeneutics* 155
approach. Within the third quest the holism approach is gaining support,

The atomistic and diachronic approach of the traditio-critical methods (source, form, redaction criticism in combination with the criteria of authenticity) is now being challenged by holistic, synchronic and interdisciplinary methods (literary and social scientific).64

Robert Funk, a prominent member of the Jesus seminar, identifies the first function of historical investigation as 'to isolate and establish the particular. particulars are established by attempting to verify each item either by confirmation of independent sources or by comparative evidence.65

Once this authentic material has been identified the second function is the work of interpretation and reconstruction. However, this seemingly objective selection of data, is also part of the interpretative and reconstructive process. Holism challenges this atomistic approach, by 'insisting that the particulars are always already examined within a context, and the context will not wait for the authentic particulars to be established'.66

Dale Allison, in contrast to Funk, states that the 'initial task is to create a context, a primary frame of reference, for the Jesus tradition, a context that may assist us in determining both the authenticity of traditions and their interpretations.67 A context is necessary for examining the data, even with those who follow a 'criteria approach'. The difference to a criteria/atomistic approach is that the paradigm and larger context is declared upfront. This is not to say that those scholars who follow a criteria approach are deliberately being deceptive but it is to say that they are not fully aware of the automatic cognitive activity of larger stories, horizons and paradigms.

In Jesus, Justice and the Reign of God: A Ministry of Liberation, William Herzog states that all scholars work with a gestalt, that is a 'a configuration or pattern of elements so unified as a whole that it cannot be described merely as a sum of its parts', which interprets and shapes the data from the beginning69. . According to Herzog ,

64 Telford 'Major Trends and Interpretative Methods' in Chilton, Bruce, and Craig A. Evans. 1998. Studying the Historical Jesus: 69
65 Robert Funk Honest to Jesus 61, cited in Denton Historiography and Hermeneutics 156
66 Denton Historiography and Hermeneutics 157
67 Allison Jesus of Nazareth 36, cited in Denton Historiography and Hermeneutics 157, Dunn 'Can the Third Quest hope to succeed' Chilton and Evans Authenticating the Activities of Jesus, 47. ‘'Of course, the above claims need to be demonstrated in more detail. But if such a broad picture can be sketched in with some confidence, then we are in a much better position to evaluate key particulars. The question again and again will be not so much 'Is this detail or that detail historically reliable?' but 'Does this particular build into a coherent and consistent picture of the person who made the impact on the broader picture'….But the broad picture of Jesus can still be sound, even if much of the detail remains vague.’”
68 http://www.thefreedictionary.com/gestalt
69 Denton Historiography and Hermeneutics 158-159 discusses the methodology of Herzog
'The necessity of positing a 'hypothesis' about the historical Jesus and then testing it by analysing the pieces of the Jesus tradition in the context of recent work on ancient Palestine would keep the relationship between the parts and the whole at the centre of the enquiry.'  

Not all are in favour of the holism approach. As Telford comments,

There are still considerable reservations about the use of such methods and approaches, however, especially in Continental scholarship. Many still doubt that the data can bear the weight of the holistic constructions that are placed upon it.'  

**Critique of Holism**

Holism rightfully recognises that the authenticating of data is part of the interpretative process, for the scholar is not operating from the vantage point of pure reason, but is functioning, as with all forms of knowledge, from within a certain worldview or horizon. The scholar, even if she tries to resist it, is unable to come to the data without a preconceived idea as to the identity of Jesus, or with a working hypothesis, however basic, of the development of Christian thought.

Holism seeks to survey the data *for intelligible patterns, and these patterns serve as the context within which to view all the data, or the hypothesis against which to test the data.* Yet the historian must, in my opinion, also have a working hypothesis as to the trustworthiness of the material. If the gospels are assumed as basically trustworthy then a criteria approach, risks losing authentic data, unless coherency is allowed a dominant role. However, if one views the gospels as unreliable then a strict criteria approach must be used. Holism, cannot be a 'conservatives' method which allow them to bypass historical method—a fundamentalist in historians attire—but can be used as a historical method which recognises that ones approach to the gospels, criteria and reconstruction are based upon the limits of ones horizon, on presuppositions and hypotheses which can be rightfully declared up front. To interact with data requires decision making, but data control should never be assumed to be the end point, for it is open to reconsideration and correction.

Meyer defends the reciprocal nature of reconstruction and data control.

'though historical investigation proceeds on distinct levels of data control and fact establishment, progress on each level is not isolated but reciprocal. The levels interact

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71 Questions have been raised against the holistic approach by William Telford . Major Trends and Interpretative Issues 69,

72 Denton 160
spirally, with hypothesis and verifications on one level continually modified in light of those on the other. Meyer consistently stresses that decisions on the historicity of data 'data control' cannot simply be settled at the outset of historical investigation, prior to the establishment of the facts. Of course, certain initial decisions of 'data' will have to be made at the beginning, or else the investigation of data could not even get underway, the enquiry may uncover a network of relations that shed new light on the data, giving them a sense more historically cogent that the historian could previously have envisioned.  

Notes + Comments

Wright has proved to be a stimulating writer who rightly, in my opinion, highlights the need for historians to declare upfront their methodologies. Wright, as with Crossan and Meier, is to be praised for spelling out his own epistemology and method. My research into the historical Jesus must take account of historiographical concerns. With Wright I reject a 'modernist/positivist' approach to historiography as being epistemologically arrogant, whilst simultaneously refusing to adopt a complete postmodern position as a reality does exist outside of the mind of the knower, historical knowledge can be gained, and there is such a thing as good and bad reconstructions of past events. Critical Realism allows one to make claims to historical knowledge whilst being open to critique and review.

As Wright, seeks to understand the 'inside of an event' I realise that to understand Jesus self understanding regarding his death, is to enter into understanding the driving forces, passions, and intent of the community, and Jesus as an individual within a larger culture. To find the 'inside of an event' is littered with distractions, each of which could broken down into several research projects. However, the task of the historian is to construct a portrait of Jesus which is plausible, or in my case a view of Jesus own self-understanding which, with methodology declared, is able to enter into the public arena, as tentative historical knowledge. Wright has produced a schema for understanding the worldview/mindset. Can his method be improved upon, does Wright's method appear to much involved in the world of theology and ideas without taking into account other socio-economic factors. Holism, that is constructing a large scale portrait of Jesus, is in my opinion the way forward. However in disagreement with Wright I think that this must take place recognising that decisions will need to be made about which data to work from. Wright illustrate

73 Meyer Aims of Jesus 8
this problem in JVOG in which, for pragmatic reasons, he does not engage with the Johannine material. I could in my research, seek to offer a detailed study of Mark 10:45 or the last supper, but these verses can only be investigated historically when they are part of a larger portrait, hypothesis, if one wants to get inside the event.

Appendix 1: Notes on Lonergan, Meyer and Critical Realism

In adopting a critical realist position Wright is building upon the work of New Testament scholar Ben Meyer, who advocated an understanding of critical realism which, in turn, was based upon the work of Jesuit philosopher-theologian, Berhard Lonergan. Wright makes frequent reference to Ben Meyers Aims of Jesus in his footnotes and read Critical Realism and the New Testament whilst preparing the draft of NTPOG. For Wright, Meyer is the 'unsung hero of biblical studies.

Lonergan developed a 'transcendental method' known as critical realism by which one can intentionally and consciously know things. Knowledge usually occurs as a spontaneous functioning of the mind but Lonergan proposes a transcendental method of knowing which is both conscious and intentional. The critical-realist seeks to be self aware of the process of knowing (conscious) and directs his thinking towards an object (intentional).

Full human knowledge, according to Lonergan, involves a three stage cognitional level of knowing which usually occurs spontaneously in the mind of the knower but can be objectified in a critical realist methodology. These three levels are experience, understanding and act of judgement.


75 See NTPOG page 32 fn 3&4, 7 fn 6,


77 NTPOG 98 Wright in private conversation with myself mentioned that Meyer, and Walsh who we will discuss later, have been particularly crucial in shaping his methodological position. Although Wright does not interact with Lonergan directly it will be helpful to outline his epistemology which heavily influence Ben Meyer.
Experience ---> Understanding -----> Act of Judgement

1) Experience: The senses provides data for knowledge which in themselves do not constitute fully human knowledge. Animals and small infants relate to the world in this experiential level alone. We do not have direct access to knowledge using the senses, the senses merely provide data which when acted upon by understanding and judgement become knowledge.

2) Understanding: Questions are then put to this raw data which bring an intelligible unity to this data.

3) Act of Judgement: The knower is then in the position to judge the answers which are provided by understanding.

In a critical realist approach these stages to knowing are pursued consciously and intentionally to provide 'virtually unconditioned' knowledge' in which the truth conditions have been consciously verified. The known world, perceived through experience, understanding and judgement, is the only world which can be known to us.

We may note here the active role of the subject within knowledge, which is achieved, not by the path of naïve realism, but is rooted in authentic subjectivity.

'Truth, in fine, ripens, on the tree of the subject, and objectivity is the fruit of subjectivity at its most intense and persistent.' 78

Lonergan, Meyer and Wright stand against an epistemological objectivity that assumes that any person given enough time, evidence and intelligence, this is turn though raises the question as to how knowledge can be achieved given the subjectivity of the knower.

Understanding( Asking Questions) and Act of Judgement (Verification) take place within the knower's Horizon which Lonergan defines as the 'maximum field of vision from a determinate standpoint' and is thus the boundary in which one knows. The horizon of an individual dictates

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78 Meyer Critical Realism and the New Testament 140
the limits of one's knowledge, the questions which are asked in understanding, and the acceptability of the answers in the act of judging.

As our field of vision, so too the scope of our knowledge, and the range of our interests are bounded. As fields of vision vary with one's standpoint, so to the scope of one's knowledge and the range of one's interests vary with the period in which one lives, one's social background and milieu, one's education and personal development. So there has arisen a metaphorical or perhaps analogous meaning of the word, horizon. In this sense what lies beyond one's horizon is simply outside the range of one's knowledge and interests: one neither knows nor cares. But what lies within one's horizon in some measure, great or small, an object of interest and knowledge. 79

This field of horizon is continuously being reshaped by the world around us.

not only from sources listed in the handbooks or monographs, but from the thousand and one additional sources of information, inspiration, wonder, feeling, conjecture that crowd the life of the individual scholar and continuously reshape his horizons. 80

Horizons, the framework from which knowledge is gained, can change but one is unable to argue from within a field of horizon the advantage of another horizon. Instead a change of horizon takes place by a matter of conversion in which a different field of vision is imagined which at first sight seems incomprehensible.

By conversion is understood a transformation of the subject and his world. Normally, it is a prolonged process though its explicit acknowledgement may be concentrated in a few momentous judgements and decisions. It is a resultant change of course and direction. It as if one's eyes were opened and one's former world faded and fell away... Conversion, as lived, affects all of a man's conscious and intentional operations. It directs his gaze, pervades his imagination, releases the symbols that penetrate to the depths of his physique. It enriches his understanding, guides his judgements, reinforces his decisions. 81

Donald Denton, who has taken the time and effort to engage thoroughly with Lonergan, is an authority on issues of critical realism and new testament study, offers a critique of Wright's critical realist approach 82. Previously I mentioned that Wright seeks to avoid two epistemological extremes, that of 'naïve realism' and 'phenomenalism'. In doing so Denton, and I believe rightly, says that Wright has presented 'strawpersons' so that 'anyone who utilizes historical method in New

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79 Lonergan method 41
80 Meyer , denton page 90
81 Lonergan Method 239
82 Denton Appendix II particularly pages 218-220
Testament studies would claim to be 'critical realist'.\(^{83}\) However I do think that Denton is incorrect to say that Wright offers 'little in the way of a specific alternative' or that Wright needs 'to do more than reflect a general attitude of epistemic modesty'.\(^{84}\), for Wright demonstrates that his version of critical realism proceeds by a method of hypothesis/verification, looks at aims/intentions via a worldview hermeneutic. Denton is no doubt correct, however, insisting that Lonergan's specific cognitional method has become 'somewhat diffuse and diluted' in Wright.\(^{85}\) This is illustrated by Wright's advocacy of the critical realism of T.F. Torrance, and Andrew Louth as well as Meyer, given that each author advocates a different from of critical realism.\(^{86}\)

Apdex 2: Notes on Meyer and Meier, Holism and Atomism

Critical Realism and Historical Method

In the first chapter of *The Aims of Jesus* Meyer sketches out two methodological stages in the quest for the historical Jesus since Reimarus.\(^{87}\) The first stage, from Baur to Conzelmann, was concerned with blaming of the sources. The aim with these scholars was to find the earliest sources from the Jesus tradition. They were, according to Meyer, 'mesmerised by a siren song: the lure of early sources, the critical importance of reducing to a minimum the time-lag between event and account'.\(^{88}\) They desire for 'objective sources was a positivist prejudice grounded in the illusion that access to history should not be mediated by the intelligence of the historian himself but rather should be 'objectively' guaranteed by sources equipped to do his job for him'.\(^{89}\)

The second stage was that of 'blame the methods' in which a there became a desire to have a vigorous methodology by which sources could be analysed, via linguistic, environmental, and source analysis. We may say that a 'criteria approach' to historical Jesus research' was also a debate about which methods are the best to use against the Jesus tradition, to reveal authentic material and reject later tradition.

\(^{83}\) Denton 219  
\(^{84}\) Denton 219  
\(^{85}\) Denton 220  
\(^{86}\) NTPOG 43  
\(^{87}\) See Denton Chapter 5  
\(^{88}\) Meyer *Aims* 38  
\(^{89}\) *Ibid.* 38
Meyer understands these two phases of historical Jesus scholarship, that of 'blame the methods' and 'blame the sources' to be faulty at a presuppositional level for the establishing of data is a form of knowledge and does not give access to 'objective' data. Historical investigation, proceeding by hypothesis and verification, does not first establish the data and the produce a hypothesis on the 'authentic material', instead the task of 'data control' and the overall hypothesis are linked.

Though historical investigation proceeds on distinct levels of data control and fact establishment, progress on each level is not isolated but reciprocal. The levels interact spirally, with hypothesis and verifications on one level continually modified in light of those on the other. Meyer consistently stresses that decisions on the historicity of data 'data control' cannot simply be settled at the outset of historical investigation, prior to the establishment of the facts. Of course, certain initial decisions of 'data' will have to be made at the beginning, or else the investigation of data could not even get underway, the enquiry may uncover a network of relations that shed new light on the data, giving them a sense more historically cogent that the historian could previously have envisioned. Aims

J.P. Meier and Atomistic Approach

In footnotes to A Marginal Jew, Meier offers the following criticisms of the the holisitic approach. He is responding to Latourelle 'Criteres d'authenticite, who advocated a 'criterion of necessary explanation (explication necessaire)' which is similar to an approach which seeks coherency and holism as a starting point.

1. 'seeks to give a to give a coherent and sufficient explanation of a considerable ensemble of facts or data' Most of this book consist of sifting bit by bit through individual sayings, deeds, and motifs contained in the Gospels,' The criterion of necessary explanation 'will be useful only at the end of the process.'

2. 'presumes a coherence among the data that may be verified at the end of the process, but methodologically cannot be proved at the beginning.'

3. 'A review of a representative sample of books on the Historical Jesus shows that exegetes of every stripe claim that they have found the coherent explanation that illuminates all the facts about Jesus

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90 Ibid. 38
91 Denton 118
92 Meier, John P. A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus: v. 1. 194
4. 'We are all called to a 'holistic' approach. But until we have at least a vague idea of what parts might qualify as belonging to the historical whole, 'a 'holistic' approach remains a distant ideal'.

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